New Rules, Old Questions: What the UN’s Latest Carbon Market Decisions Mean for Forests and Communities

16 November 2026

New standards for cookstove carbon credits promise greater environmental integrity. But can better accounting rules address the deeper problems of carbon markets?

By: Sophia Arias, Rahi Kumbar, Bob Yang, undergraduate students at the University of Southern California with the Gibson Climate Justice Lab

Can carbon credits for improved cookstoves in Myanmar really protect forests and combat global climate change? 

The United Nations’ new carbon market is betting that it can. But a growing number of civil society organizations are questioning whether the promises behind these credits can be trusted. 

On October 9, the UN’s Article 6.4 Supervisory Body concluded its twenty-third meeting (SBM023) by approving two new methodologies for generating carbon credits from cleaner, more efficient household cookstoves. These credits are marketed, in part, on the claim that cleaner stoves reduce the wood harvested for cooking fuel. 

That same week, over 130 civil society groups were still waiting for an answer to their call to suspend credits under the new mechanism, which faces serious concerns over human rights and carbon accounting.   

Against this backdrop, student researchers with the Gibson Climate Justice Lab (GCJLab) at the University of Southern California ask how SBM023 addressed, or failed to address, the problems civil society organizations have repeatedly identified.  

Can improved cookstoves really protect forests?

The promise behind cookstove projects sounds straightforward: households use less firewood, fewer trees are harvested, and fewer greenhouse gases enter the atmosphere.

But the relationship between cooking fuel and forest protection is considerably more complicated. 

Fuelwood may come from multiple sources, including deadwood, agricultural residues, managed woodlots, or natural forests. Reducing household wood consumption does not automatically translate into an equivalent reduction in deforestation, yet carbon-crediting methodologies depend on assumptions about how much fuelwood would otherwise have been harvested and whether that biomass would have regenerated. 

There are also questions about how emissions reductions are measured. Distributing an improved cookstove does not guarantee that households will use it consistently or abandon traditional cooking practices. Overestimating these changes can generate credits for emissions reductions that were never realized. 

Beyond the accounting concerns, these projects risk overlooking the traditional knowledge, livelihoods and customary forest management practices of Indigenous and local communities, and despite the UNFCCC’s claims that cleaner cookstoves “empower women,” they rely almost entirely on the unpaid labor of women who have very little say in project design and implementation, and receive no share of the financial benefits.

The issue is not whether households should have access to cleaner cooking technologies. They should. The question is whether changes in their cooking practices can then be used to justify continued emissions elsewhere. 

New rules, old problems: What changed at SBM023?

Clean cooking methodologies were at the heart of SBM023’s agenda. With numerous projects being grandfathered into the new systems, transitioning them to comply with new standards was the main priority. 

At SBM023, the Body approved two new methodologies for generating carbon credits from household cooking activities, which will replace existing CDM methodologies. The first, Cooking Energy Transitions, covers shifts toward lower-emission household cooking technologies and fuels. The second, Energy Efficiency Measures in Household Cooking, addresses improvements in cooking efficiency, including technologies that reduce the amount of biomass needed to prepare food. While the UNFCCC has yet to officially implement either methodology, they found that focusing on improvements in cooking efficiency would result in greater reversal buffer deductions from credits compared to historical baselines.

Compared with the Myanmar project’s AMS-II.G calculations (which used a 10% baseline improvement in efficiency and existing monitoring rules for continued traditional stove use), A6.4-AMM-005 overhauls several core variables. It introduces a performance-based baseline benchmark, requires household fuel measurements covering all cooking devices in use, and mandates reversal-buffer contributions that are immediately cancelled. At the same time, it raises the fuelwood CO2 emission factor from 63.7 to 112tCO2/TJ and incorporates non-CO2 emissions into the calculation. Because these methodological changes pull in opposite directions, determining how the Myanmar project’s credit volume would change under A6.4-AMM-005 is not possible without a full recalculation using household-level measurement data and a project-specific reversal-risk assessment.

Neither is entirely new, as they both build on earlier carbon-crediting approaches under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, the carbon trading predecessor to the Paris Agreement.

The Body also adopted new sampling and survey requirements intended to improve the reliability of emissions calculations. These changes matter, because carbon markets have often faced criticism for issuing credits that exaggerate emissions reductions. 

However, several decisions illustrate the limits of these technical reforms. 

For example, the Supervisory Body granted the household efficiency methodology an exemption from a downward adjustment to credited emissions reductions in the second and subsequent calendar years. It also requested further work on how uncertainty should be treated when project developers use alternative or measured data. 

Taken together the range of uncertainties coming from these decisions pose a risk of overcrediting and detrimental harm to the climate.

A woman using an improved cookstove in Myanmar. Soneva Foundation/Flickr

What happens when promised benefits do not last?

SBM023 also addressed another important issue: reversal risk.

In carbon markets, a reversal usually occurs when a previously credited climate benefit is subsequently lost. For example, carbon sequestered in a forest can be released when trees die, burn, or are cut down.

But cookstove projects raise a different question.

Unlike forest-based offsets which draw down and store carbon from the atmosphere, improved cookstoves generally claim to avoid emissions altogether by reducing fuel consumption. If households stop using the improved cookstoves, future emissions savings (which have already been modeled out) may disappear.  

Rules designed to protect stored carbon, such as those for forest carbon removal projects, may not then be appropriate for every type of emissions-reduction or avoidance project. 

At SBM023, the Supervisory Body adopted a new risk-reversal tool and requested that its expert panel continue monitoring evidence that could justify revising the risk factors applied to activities reducing non-renewable biomass consumption.

It also acknowledged unresolved accounting problems associated with the carbon market’s buffer pool. Buffer pools function by reserving a set amount of carbon credits from each project that are not sold. These credits serve as a ‘buffer’ if other credits in the project face reversal risks or fail to meet efficiency standards. Rather than resolving these problems though, the Body requested further analysis of alternative approaches and their implications for national climate accounting.

For cookstove credits, the practical test is whether credible emissions estimates are backed by arrangements capable of addressing reversals. The effectiveness of these rules will depend on how both requirements are met in practice. These questions about technical credibility also raise the issue of whose evidence informs the rules.

Myanmar exposes the limits of technical reform

The controversy surrounding Myanmar’s cookstove project makes these concerns especially urgent. 

In October, more than 130 civil society groups called for the suspension of all carbon credits from the project, citing concerns about the credits’ integrity and their connections to institutions operating under Myanmar’s military junta. 

Since the military seized power in February 2021, Myanmar has experienced widespread violence, repression, and serious human rights violations.

This context prompts serious questions about the involvement of state institutions controlled by the junta in the cookstove project, alongside questions about whether meaningful oversight, verification, and community participation – all required under Art. 6.4 mechanisms – are even possible under these conditions. 

In addition to being under junta control, carbon credit generation in Myanmar is being administered by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) rather than a non-nationally affiliated body.  With clean cookstoves serving as aid for underprivileged communities in Myanmar, many civil society groups question whether their MONREC can be trusted to evenly distribute cookstoves through the Dry Zone Greening Department (DZGD) and other regional departments while MONREC is under the illegal control of the junta. 

These are not issues that can be solved simply by improving emissions calculations. A carbon crediting project can satisfy technical requirements while still violating environmental, social and cultural norms and rules. 

Although the Supervisory Body formally addressed some stakeholder inputs at SBM023, they did not address this appeal directly and ultimately chose not to revoke any credits from the cookstove project. Rather, they revised risk reversal assessments to account for “human-induced reversal risk.”

As a result of this controversy, there was some reluctance among the Supervisory Body to even account for so much reversal risk at all, since it can decrease the worth of clean cooking credits by as much as 60%.

Furthermore, an interesting trend throughout SBM023 was the brevity of stakeholder consideration. As a whole, stakeholder input was initially presented but not followed up on later in negotiations. Outside input on cookstoves and forest protection was incorporated during Monday’s discussion but day-by-day, stakeholder input was hardly discussed past the Secretariat’s opening. 

Final Thoughts

SBM023 repeated a familiar failure of international negotiations: stakeholder input was treated as an afterthought. Time pressure, claims of irrelevance and members’ personal opinions crowded out serious engagement with what stakeholders had submitted. Forest-dependent and cookstove-using communities are among those most exposed to climate impacts, yet their views were not at the center of the decisions that affect them. The perspectives that carried the room were mostly those of credit-purchasing countries, not of the communities that generate the credits.

The way input was handled made this worse. The secretariat presented stakeholder statements without verifying them, attributing them or providing supporting evidence, so the Body had little basis to weigh them fairly. For example, Olga Gassan-Zade, the Chair of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body, noted that in response to the Methodological Expert Panel’s (MEP) request for views on credit non-permanence, eleven statements were presented, six in support and five opposed , yet each represented anywhere from ten to 100 people. Presenting them as equal in weight further obscures forest-dwelling communities and civil society in global debate.

The substantive outcomes follow the same pattern. The Body tightened sampling rules and added reversal-risk safeguards, but then weakened those safeguards with exemptions and postponed hard questions on uncertainty and buffer pools. Its refusal to suspend the junta-linked Myanmar cookstove project shows that technical compliance cannot substitute for human rights and political legitimacy. No amount of methodological fine-tuning can fix a market still designed around the priorities of credit buyers rather than the realities of forest-dependent communities.

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