

# AFR100: Driving commercial tree plantation expansion in Africa?

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


Pledges made towards the African Forest Landscape Restoration Initiative (AFR100) could result in nearly doubling the scale of commercial tree plantations across the continent.

AFR100 is an Africa-wide initiative aiming to restore 100 million hectares of degraded forest land by 2030, and pledges from 30 countries have now exceeded the target by more than 25 million hectares. It was launched in 2015 at the Paris Climate Summit as one of four initiatives contributing to the Bonn Challenge,<sup>1</sup> and has recently completed phase one of its implementation (2015-2020), which aimed to mobilize African governments and other stakeholders to participate in the initiative. Phase two (2020-2030), where most of the actual restoration work will take place, aims to support the implementation of the pledges and the initiative is now hoping to **leverage US\$100 billion** to achieve the targets pledged. AFR100 is therefore at a key juncture: the promises made must now be implemented.

Removing carbon from the atmosphere through restoring forests and other ecosystems is vital to tackling the climate crisis, and initiatives like AFR100 can play an important role in this. Many of the projects associated

with AFR100 and the momentum it has created are clearly making highly valuable contributions to landscape restoration. However, the projects showcased on the AFR100 website together account for less than one percent of the



**Targets for commercial tree plantation expansion contributing to or running concurrently with AFR100 pledges.** Source: Various, see table on page 11.

1. The Bonn Challenge aims to operationalize the New York Declaration on Forests by bringing 150 million hectares of deforested and degraded land into restoration by 2020 and 350 million hectares by 2030. In addition to AFR100, three other regional initiatives include ECCA30 in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Initiative 20x20 in Latin America and the Caribbean nations, and the Agadir Commitment in the Mediterranean region.

total commitment made, highlighting just how much implementation there is still to do. Further still, AFR100's multi-stakeholder approach and emphasis on public-private partnerships and leveraging private sector investment **leaves the door open to corporate capture**. It is no surprise therefore that significant emphasis has been

placed on commercial tree plantations in national-level pledges.

Half of the 30 participating countries currently have targets involving commercial plantations that fall within or are concurrent with their AFR100 pledges. Put together, these involve over 4.5 million hectares of commercial

tree plantation expansion, and 770,000 hectares of improved plantation management.<sup>2</sup> This is equivalent to a 91% increase in land area currently occupied by commercial plantations in Africa,<sup>3</sup> and would need to be implemented at an alarming rate—nearly half a million hectares a year. This compares to an estimated **125,000 hectares of commercial forest plantation expansion** to have taken place in total over the past two decades.

These figures for plantation expansion are likely to be significant underestimates given that more than half of the 30 participating countries have not yet published forest landscape restoration (FLR) strategies or other relevant national plans. On top of this, many pledges also rely heavily on other kinds of plantations, often described as “woodlots” or “agroforestry plantations”, which are wide-ranging terms but can have similar impacts.<sup>4</sup>

Alongside targets for commercial tree plantation expansion are also a number of targets for boosting private sector control over public forest lands. For example, Rwanda's government aims to allocate 80% of public forest plantations to private operators (from a baseline of 14%), Togo has a similar target of 62%, and Tanzania aims to increase private-sector managed tree plantations by 100,000 hectares. Numerous other countries also aim to boost private sector involvement in commercial timber and energy plantations through public-private partnerships.



Steve Slater/Flickr

## AFR100's main public backer: The German Government

The German government through its Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) plays a key role in AFR100. It was a founding member of the initiative, is its main financial backer and sits on the initiative's Management Committee as the only representative of a national government, alongside GIZ, WRI, IUCN, FAO and the World Bank. BMZ's support for AFR100 falls under its Forest Action Plan, which has invested EUR 2 billion in forest-related projects,<sup>1</sup> including the GIZ-implemented **Forests4Future program**, which deals with issues related to the Bonn Challenge and other international FLR-related initiatives. Forests4Future has so far provided around 4.4 million Euros in support of AFR100, including financing AUDA-NEPAD, which acts as the AFR100 secretariat, and FLR projects in Togo, Ethiopia, Cameroon and Madagascar,<sup>2</sup> all of which include tree plantations in their AFR100 pledges to one extent or another.

1. AFR100 Mid-Term Review  
2. Information provided by GIZ

2. See table on page 11.


3. The FSC's Strategic Review on the Future of Forest Plantations (2012) estimated that there were almost 5 million hectares of industrial forest plantations in Africa. The FAO's Global Forest Resources Assessment 2020 estimates the total area of plantation forest in Africa to be 5.7 million hectares, of which 4 million hectares are composed of introduced species such as eucalyptus and pine.

4. For example, the **Green Charcoal Project in Uganda** focused on smallholder woodlots of eucalyptus trees, which translated into large-scale plantation expansion with significant impacts on local communities.

With AFR100 implementation now ramping up, the extent to which commercial tree plantations feature in FLR strategies and the emphasis on private-sector involvement are a great concern going forward. Although restoration approaches are hugely varied, private investment is likely to focus on schemes which generate a profit, making commercial tree plantations (and offsetting) likely favourites. In addition, a clear lack of monitoring capacity<sup>5</sup> (the AFR100 Mid-Term review states that “without a monitoring system, negative outcomes are hard to detect”) and transparency across the scheme are also cause for concern, as these two factors make it extremely hard for civil society to monitor what is happening on-the-ground, and to independently assess what is being implemented.

The only publicly-available means of monitoring implementation currently is through the **Bonn Challenge Barometer**, and this newly-implemented country-level

Restoration types in thousands of hectares since 2011 according to the Bonn Challenge Barometer



Source: <https://infoflr.org/countries>

assessment of progress towards pledges made in 2011 sets a worrying trend. Two AFR100 countries have so far carried out the Barometer: “Planted forests and woodlots” account for 82% of Madagascar’s 1.5 million hectares of “restoration”, and almost 50% of Rwanda’s 700,000 hectares.

This briefing analyzes three case studies on pledges and projects contributing to AFR100 that

involve commercial tree plantations, and where private companies are benefiting from public finance that should be used to regenerate and restore forests to sequester carbon sustainably. These case studies also allow us to gain a better understanding of what a 76% increase in commercial plantations could look like across the continent, should the initiative’s targets be achieved.

## Proposed new funding mechanism for commercial afforestation in Africa: Poised to help fulfil AFR100 pledges?

The 2019 report “**Towards Large-Scale Commercial Investment in African Forestry**” is a feasibility study carried out by the Climate Investment Funds “to assist the African Development Bank (AfDB) and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Kenya in evaluating and designing alternative private funding models for commercial forestry in Africa with a view to ultimately establishing...a specialized investment vehicle for commercial forestry plantations.” The report identified almost 500,000 hectares of land suitable for commercial forestry across ten countries (of which eight are AFR100 countries), and set a target for the finance of an additional 100,000 hectares of commercial tree plantations in Sub-Saharan Africa, of which 47% would be pine, 43% eucalyptus and 10% teak. The study highlights how “current and planned investment vehicles for Africa may only lead to the planting of 10-20% of the land available for afforestation”, whereas “Reaching sufficient scale would clearly have a transformational effect on both investor perceptions of African forestry and on the progress towards numerous development goals, including the SDGs and AFR100.”



5. A number of speakers at the 5th Annual AFR100 Stakeholder’s Meeting made it clear that monitoring capacity is virtually nonexistent in most participating countries.





## Mozambique: Major pulp and paper company benefiting from forest restoration funds

Justiça Ambiental

Mozambique has Africa's highest target for commercial tree plantation expansion, with its 2009 National Reforestation Plan aiming to increase plantation areas from around 60,000 hectares to one million hectares in 2030.

Whether a coincidence or not, Mozambique's AFR100 restoration target is also one million hectares. In the absence of a dedicated FLR strategy, Mozambique's AFR100 commitment currently centres around the country's **2016 Forest Investment Plan (MozFIP)**, which is funded by the World Bank, and was devised to "address the drivers of deforestation and promote sustainable rural development". It implements Mozambique's National REDD+ Strategy, which focuses on increasing carbon sequestration capacity through industrial and small-scale forest plantations, and targets at least 250,000 hectares of commercial tree plantations by 2030.

Central to this target is Portucel Moçambique, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Portugal-based The Navigator Company, which is Europe's top producer of bleached eucalyptus pulp. Portucel plans to develop around 200,000 hectares

of industrial eucalyptus plantations as part of a US\$2.3 billion investment in Zambezia and Manica provinces, involving a government land concession of over 350,000 hectares and the promised construction of a new pulp mill and the creation of 6,500 jobs. In 2014 the International Finance Corporation (IFC, part of the World Bank Group) **invested US\$32 million into Portucel** to support the establishment of the first 40,000 hectares of plantations in Zambezia province, although so far only around 13,500 hectares have been planted and the wood harvested from the plantations has been **shipped to a pulp mill in Portugal** as roundwood.

Portucel Moçambique sits on the MozFIP Steering Committee, and is also a direct beneficiary of the scheme. One of the sub-projects being financed under MozFIP is the IFC's "**Emissions Reductions in the Forest Sector through Planted**

**Forests**", which was approved in 2017 and basically subsidises Portucel's corporate social responsibility commitments to the tune of US\$1.85 million.

According to the IFC, "*The supported activities are expected to enhance the developmental impact of Portucel's investment and create shared growth opportunities for local communities in its concession areas...*". However, research conducted by Justiça Ambiental and other CSOs shows that Portucel's plantations have had a highly detrimental impact on local communities, even though only a relatively small area has been planted so far.

A **report published in 2016** by Justiça Ambiental documents visits to affected communities and interviews with local people. It describes the widespread despair of the poor, rural communities and how most of the affected



groups feel deceived by the promises of a better life and employment and the construction of schools and wells that have never materialized. It also describes numerous issues with the process by which Portucel was granted its land concessions, a process conducted in secrecy, with insufficient consultation with local communities, and which left many farmers feeling that their land had been stolen from them.

Justiça Ambiental's **most recent visit to Zambezia in April 2021** highlighted how the plight of impacted communities remains. In the community of Hapala, they also documented how years of conflict over land has left residents visibly afraid to speak out due to intimidation from Portucel and even certain members of the local government. Residents have been threatened with legal action for speaking out, have been summoned to the local

police station for taking part in interviews and have been repeatedly visited by up to three Portucel employees who have taken publicity materials off them and photographed them. In one case, a local leader was even being **paid by Portucel to covertly photograph Justiça Ambiental members** during their visit.

In the community of Namarroi, local farmers have recently taken action to reclaim their lands by occupying areas that have been cleared by Portucel but not yet planted. They reported how agricultural support supposedly offered to local communities by Portucel was benefiting just 37 people out of a population of over 1000 families that had lost farm land.

As well as the significant social impacts that Portucel is causing, centred around a loss of land tenure rights and food security,

the impacts on forest ecosystems could also be profound. Although it is claimed that only marginal, abandoned or low-yielding land in need of restoration is being planted, and that the “mosaic” planting model allows for sensitive areas to be protected, a **report published in 2017** highlights the extent to which the eucalyptus plantations will impact on the remaining *miombo* forest and savanna ecosystem. These forests are home to some 8,500 species of plant and 633 bird species. The report states that some 115,000 hectares of Portucel's land concession earmarked for planting are classed as densely wooded “sensitive areas”. According to MozFIP documentation, Miombo forests are important reservoirs of above- and below-ground carbon and an important habitat for a number of endangered species, as well as being extremely important to the income and subsistence of small-scale farming communities.

Although MozFIP, Mozambique's REDD+ strategy and the various projects that fall under them aim to reduce deforestation, sequester carbon and improve the living conditions of rural communities, their strategy of promoting investment in private sector industrial tree plantations as a model that can be rolled out nationwide is clearly having the opposite effect. The danger now is that AFR100 is successful in leveraging the extra investment required to achieve the targets for plantation expansion that have been set, which would cause far greater impacts over a much wider area.



Justiça Ambiental



## UNIQUE Forestry and Land Use GmbH: AFR100 technical partners profiting from tree plantations

Chris Lang

UNIQUE Forestry and Land Use GmbH (UNIQUE) is an AFR100 technical partner that has positioned itself to both advise the initiative and participating governments on FLR strategies, and to benefit directly from them through investments in commercial tree plantations.

UNIQUE describes itself as a “forest management and consulting firm” and is headquartered in Germany. Its portfolio includes providing consultancy services to the World Bank, European Investment Bank, the German Development Agency GIZ, WWF, and The Nature Conservancy, among others, as well as governments and companies, on issues of agriculture, forestry and land use and climate change. It also manages tree plantations on behalf of two plantation companies in Paraguay, and acts as a private-sector investor through co-ownership of the Arbaro Fund, which has so far invested in plantations in Paraguay, Ghana and Sierra Leone.

UNIQUE established the Arbaro Fund in partnership with the German asset management company Finance in Motion. It is a private equity investment fund

that aims to plant or purchase 75,000 hectares of commercial tree plantations across seven countries in Latin America and Africa, including four that have made AFR100 pledges. The Arbaro Fund’s application for finance to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) drew opposition from 133 civil society organizations worldwide. They warned that Arbaro “will not be able to avoid the conflicts and failure that have been the outcome of similar attempts to establish industrial tree plantations in the past”. Despite these warnings, the GCF Board granted the Arbaro Fund \$25m, adding to previous development finance from the European Investment Bank and the Finnfund (majority owned by the Finnish state). The Arbaro Fund’s first investment was into Miro Forestry, described in more detail in the next section. Miro has plantations in Ghana and Sierra Leone, both of which are AFR100 countries, and the former has Africa’s third

highest target for tree plantation expansion.

UNIQUE’s wide-ranging involvement with AFR100 has included conducting its Mid-Term Review, which it was contracted to carry out by GIZ. UNIQUE rated AFR100’s first phase as being “very successful”, scoring 90% on sustainability. It acknowledged concerns that “degraded forests” and biodiverse grasslands could be converted to monoculture tree plantations but dismissed them, claiming that AFR100 was in such an early phase that “unintended consequences from implementation would not yet be observed”. They also brushed aside concerns about evictions, claiming that “forced resettlements” from protected areas were justified, as long as “guidelines” were observed.

As a consultant for GIZ, which sits on the AFR100 Management Committee, UNIQUE has played a



leading role in shaping FLR strategies associated with AFR100 in Ethiopia and Madagascar. In Ethiopia—one of the countries where the Arbaro Fund wants to invest—they identified **hundreds of thousands of hectares of land**, much of it “under some form of communal use”, as suitable for “Afforestation/Reforestation”, a term that usually implies tree plantations. In Madagascar, UNIQUE identified **fast growing tree plantations**, including for bioenergy, as well as the “restoration” of former industrial pine plantations as key FLR priorities. The **FLR strategy subsequently adopted by Madagascar’s government** explicitly includes tree plantations, including half a million hectares of vaguely-termed “agroforestry plantations”.

In Mozambique, which has Africa’s largest target for tree plantations expansion, UNIQUE advised the World Bank on a project called “**Improving Business Climate for Planted Forests**”, aimed at promoting a national strategy for attracting private sector investments in tree plantations. Around the same time, UNIQUE undertook an inventory of Mozambique’s eucalyptus plantations for an anonymous “private company”, and **advised the European Investment Bank** to grant funding to the Norwegian company Green Resources to plant 20,000 hectares of tree plantations, successfully so according to UNIQUE, though **not according to the EIB website**.



Patrick Shepherd/CIFOR

Kenya is another country with large tree plantation expansion plans included in its AFR100 pledge. UNIQUE has benefited from three recent consultancy contracts that help to contribute towards this expansion: In 2018, they advised The Nature Conservancy on setting up a “Tree Fund” to “support commercially-driven tree planting with a special emphasis on smallholders”. In 2019, they worked on a private-public partnership project for “commercial forestry” and the development of new tree plantations for the **UK-based Gatsby Charity Foundation** (a Sainsbury Family foundation). And in 2021, UNIQUE is working on a contract to help the Kenyan tree plantation company Komaza expand its plantations by 30,000 hectares over the next decade, and to access the carbon offset market. **Two of the three tree species grown by Komaza are eucalyptus**. UNIQUE’s work in Kenya illustrates how AFR100 landscape restoration pledges favoring tree plantations are translating into lucrative new contracts for the company.

Finally, UNIQUE has also recently come under fire for its involvement in a **project to import Namibian bushwood** as a replacement for coal in a large power station in Hamburg, Germany. Proponents of the project relied heavily on analysis published by UNIQUE that claimed removing bushwood from millions of hectares of land and turning it into woodchips or pellets for export to Germany would reduce Namibia’s greenhouse gas emissions. **On closer inspection**, UNIQUE’s analysis was littered with inaccuracies, including a misrepresentation of the findings of multiple peer-reviewed studies and other reports. However, the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), who had funded the study, would not engage with criticism on this issue, showing that UNIQUE enjoyed a level of trust that effectively puts it beyond scrutiny.





## Ghana: Green Climate Fund support for tree plantations

Similarly to Mozambique, Ghana does not yet have an FLR strategy detailing how its pledge of two million hectares will be achieved. However, Ghana's Forest Plantation Strategy 2016-2040 aims to establish 625,000 hectares of new commercial tree plantations, and to maintain and rehabilitate an estimated 235,000 hectares of existing plantations.

Part of this target will almost certainly be met by MIRO Forestry and Timber Products (Miro), a UK-based company who currently operate around 20,000 hectares of commercial tree plantations in Ghana and Sierra Leone, of which over 50% is exotic eucalyptus. Miro consider themselves to be *"the largest developer of new plantations in Africa for the last few years"*, expanding at a rate of 1,500 to 3,000 hectares per year.

In 2018, Miro signed an equity agreement for US\$20 million with the Arbaro Fund, which was the Fund's first investment in a plantation company. In March 2020, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) signed a US\$25 million equity agreement with the Arbaro Fund to support the. Then in December 2020, GCF's Arbaro Investment Committee approved Miro as a sub-project to this agreement, thereby helping to finance the company's future expansion.

Miro is strongly linked to AFR100 due to the fact that, as already described, **the UNIQUE Group co-founded the Arbaro Fund** and acts as a key consultant to AFR100, its public sector backers and participating African governments. Further still, the World Resources Institute (WRI), one of six organizations with a place on the AFR100 Management Team, has **lauded Miro** as a *"main impact investing opportunity in the African sustainable forestry space"*, and describes how the company's actions have *"helped restore the previously degraded landscape"*. Miro's director also believes that this approach to forest management counts as restoration, and is **quoted as saying**: *"In whatever way you look at it, it is restoration. How else do we bring the forest back?"*

However, Ghanaian organisation Civic Response has been highly critical of Miro's operations, and in a **2017 report** describe numerous

problems with the company's acquisition of its 5,000 hectares concession in the Boumfum Forest Reserve, which has resulted in conflicts with small-scale farming communities. Focus group discussions they conducted with community members near Miro's concession indicated that communities were neither consulted nor informed about Miro's land acquisition process, or what the company intended to do with the land. There was no negotiation with local-level governance institutions prior to Miro being granted its concessions, and the only communication from the company came when residents were informed that they had to remove their property from the area to enable the company to begin its operations.

In fact, the area of Forest Reserve granted to Miro by the Forestry Commission (FC) was formerly the subject of an MOU signed



between the District Assembly (DA) and FC, and the DA had already portioned out the land to farmers. The DA had taken on management of the land on behalf of the FC, but the latter claimed that the DA had not fulfilled their obligations such as having a management plan in place, therefore nullifying the MOU, and instead granted the land to Miro. Miro considered the farmers to be occupying the land illegally and, with little warning, cleared the farms, including food crops, farmsteads and an estimated 13,000 trees that the farmers had planted. A number of farmers with the support of the DA have since taken Miro to court, and there is now an ongoing legal dispute between the company and the affected farmers.

Other criticisms leveled at the company centre around the loss of food sovereignty and security for the farming communities, and the fact that the evicted farmers were not paid any compensation. Community members reported that farmers who had lost land had not been able to secure new

jobs of predictable income, and that day labourers that used to work on the farms had also lost their source of income. Although at the time of the report's publication the company was providing employment to some community members, according to interviewees only a limited number of people could access these jobs and workers were being paid a wage of just 1 Euro (GHS 7) per day, which in some cases was significantly less than farmers were able to earn before losing their land to the company.

More recently, the Arbaro Fund's application to the GCF for finance and the subsequent Miro sub-project application were strongly opposed by the GCF Civil Society Observers Network. A [formal submission to the Arbaro Investment Committee](#) prior to the approval of the Miro sub-project, which include the company's 4,400 hectares expansion into the Chirimfa and Awura Forest Reserves, cites the clear presence of ongoing conflict over land and expresses concern over impacts on the livelihoods of

the farmers currently present in these sites, which Miro refers to as "illegal migrant settlers". Although the farmers have no legal claim to their land, the lack of compensation and alternative livelihood options will leave them even more economically vulnerable. Further still, women and girls are often disproportionately impacted by loss of agricultural livelihood, yet the Environmental and Social Impact Assessments submitted to GCF were undertaken before GCF gender policies were introduced.

The submission also details numerous potential environmental impacts of Miro's plantations, including: impact on and chemical contamination of groundwater resources; soil compaction through heavy machinery and subsequent increased runoff; the impacts of land clearing on endangered or threatened species and other biodiversity identified in the concession areas; and the introduction of eucalyptus hybrids with little understanding of the behaviour and characteristics of the species.

In addition, the submission describes how, other than a general assumption of a high level of degradation, insufficient information has been provided on the state of the existing forest or vegetation cover, how much will need to be removed and what the greenhouse gas emissions associated with this will be. For the purpose of the project's carbon sequestration calculations these baseline emissions are assumed to be zero, but as already described, previous occupants had planted extensively in the concession area.



Axel Fassio/CIFOR

## Conclusion: Why tree plantations should be excluded from forest restoration efforts

Tree plantations are clearly a bad choice when it comes to restoring landscapes and removing carbon from the atmosphere.

Tree plantations are clearly a bad choice when it comes to restoring landscapes and removing carbon from the atmosphere. A **recent scientific paper** concluded that, in general, plantations hold little more carbon than the land cleared to plant them, and that natural forests are 40 times more effective at storing carbon than plantations, and six times better than agroforestry. The authors state unequivocally that as well as being the most effective option, natural regeneration is also the cheapest and technically easiest to achieve.

The commercial tree plantation model that Africa has followed is one of conflict and neo-colonial resource exploitation, as highlighted by the examples of Portucel in Mozambique, Miro in Ghana and Unique across the continent, and of which there are

many more. Further still, **women are disproportionately impacted by tree plantations**, especially where they replace farmland and ecosystems that communities depend on for their sustenance and livelihoods. In turn, the impacts of plantations exacerbate existing inequalities in communities, and deepen gender inequality and the violation of women's rights.

Despite this, commercial tree plantations are clearly the favored option when a priority is placed on leveraging private-sector investment. It is far easier to turn a profit through growing eucalyptus than, say, women-led community forest restoration, even if the latter is by far the best choice in terms of climate mitigation potential, biodiversity enhancement and creating sustainable livelihoods.

Few conservationists would agree that clearing native vegetation to plant monocultures of eucalyptus could be considered restoration or climate change mitigation, especially if these monocultures are harvested ten years later and turned into short-lived products or, worse still, burned for energy. Moreover, every hectare of commercial tree plantation expansion is a choice not to restore that hectare to a healthy ecosystem that communities can benefit from directly. A rights-based, ecosystem approach to FLR would protect food sovereignty, respect customary land tenure and strengthen gender justice. AFR100 and its backers should acknowledge this by excluding tree plantations from the scope of restoration efforts, and ruling-out financing them in the name of landscape restoration.



Women-led forest restoration in Narok County, Kenya. **Paran women**



# Country-level tree plantation targets contributing to or concurrent with AFR100 pledges (thousands of hectares)

Country	Commercial plantation expansion	Improved Management of existing plantations	New agroforestry plantations	Source
Benin	225			BENIN'S FIRST NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION UNDER PARIS AGREEMENT (2015)
Burkina Faso	50		1000	Forest Investment Plan for Burkina Faso (2012)
Ethiopia	310	190		Forest Sector Review (2015)
Ghana	625	235		Ghana Forest Plantation Strategy 2016-2040
Ivory Coast	807*		1450	STRATEGIE NATIONALE DE PRESERVATION, DE REHABILITATION ET D'EXTENSION DES FORETS (2018)
Kenya	400**			TECHNICAL REPORT ON THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF FOREST AND LANDSCAPE RESTORATION OPPORTUNITIES IN KENYA 2016
Madagascar		89	500	STRATÉGIE NATIONALE SUR LA RESTAURATION DES PAYSAGES FORESTIERS ET DES INFRASTRUCTURES VERTES À MADAGASCAR (2017)
Malawi	100		200	National Landscape Restoration Strategy (2017)
Mozambique	1000***			Estratégia nacional de reflorestamento 2010-2030
Rep of Congo	84			REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO PROGRAMME DE DEFINITION DES CIBLES DE NEUTRALITE EN MATIERE DE DEGRADATION DES TERRES 2018
Rwanda		256		Forest Landscape Restoration Opportunity Assessment (2014)
South Africa	100			Forestry 2030 Roadmap
Tanzania	230			NATIONAL FOREST POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 2018 – 2028
Togo	600			POLITIQUE FORESTIERE DU TOGO 2011 (décret n°2011-002/PR du 5 janvier 2011 sur la déclaration de politique forestière)
Uganda	90			National Forest Plan 2011/12 – 2021/22
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,561</b>	<b>770</b>	<b>3,150</b>	

\* Figure includes reforestation for woodfuel and timber.

\*\* Figure includes bamboo plantations.

\*\*\* From a baseline of 60,000 hectares in 2010.